interested. This implies that it is possible and desirable to speak from an impartial position. In this way, realist rhetoric attempts to preclude criticism from opponents. "Branding 'Globalization'" discusses how the report, buttressed by its realist tone, touts neoliberal globalization as the way to aid the world's poor. The link between this form of world economy and poverty reduction selectively omits evidence. "Ironic Appropriations" examines how pro-globalization discourse responds to critical counter-publics by hegemonizing their values. It constructs trade openness as the only way to achieve a variety of public goods beyond poverty alleviation. In this ironic re-appropriation of the "agenda of the streets," the realist IFI discourse tries to subsume the most salient critiques of neo-liberal globalization, including environmental protection and cultural diversity. It even claims to represent values that previously served as critical counter-norms. 4 4 Then "Technocracy and the Public" focuses on how free-market discourse works for a voluntarily non-participatory public through its assumptions about economics and politics. In an effort to delay final judgment on the neo-liberal agenda, its advocates exhort critics to maintain the faith. They claim that all concerns can yet find accommodation within a market solution. They argue that neo-liberal policy-makers are not partial but objective analysts who practice a science of economics. If economics were akin to a pure science, capable of providing a single, necessary prescription for solving each problem, and if "the market" could address a wide variety of social goals, there would be little need for political activity. In the end, "Possibilities For a Counter-Hegemonic Project" assesses the potential for sustained opposition to neoliberal globalization, given the hegemonizing power of IFI discourse.
Fixing a Hole Where the Rain Comes In
5 In recent decades, international financial institutions have gained greater influence over decision-making processes around the globe. Many IFIs, like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, originated with the goal of promoting economic development to stem poverty. Yet the type of development IFIs endorse has come to have a distinctly neo-liberal flavor. While the World Bank has been less aggressive in pursuing such policies than its sister institution, the IMF, its "Private Sector Development Strategy" belies the Bank's claim to seek a variety of approaches.
Instead it favors delivery of services by the private sector and continues to make "investment climate assessments" in line with neo-liberalism. The Bretton Woods institutions have moved toward greater policy coordination with the World Trade Organization (WTO), an institution with a mandate is to "ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible." 5 Meanwhile numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil-society leaders complain about the lack of transparency and democratic input in these institutions. 6 6 These developments may be compatible with expert-driven or technocratic politics, except that the type of "free trade" promoted is the subject of great debate among economists and generates increasing anxiety for the public. Several outspoken critics of free trade, including the former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, have pointed to the failures of market liberalization as advocated by IFIs. 7 According to economist Dani Rodrick, "countries that have bought wholeheartedly into the integration orthodoxy are discovering that openness does not deliver on its promise." 8 On the contrary, "the evidence from the experience of the last two decades is quite clear: The countries that have grown the most rapidly since the mid-1970s are those that have invested a high share of GDP and maintained macroeconomic stability. The relation between growth rates and indicators of openness . . . is weak at best." 9 The frequently mentioned success stories -China, India, and the "Asian Tigers" -did not achieve high levels of growth after implementing tariff reductions and neo-liberal reforms. Instead these governments pursued a variety of policies, many that violate the neo-liberal terms of "free trade."
7 Neo-liberal policies have damaged the material lives of many in developing countries. Contrary to some advocates' claims, the poor are disproportionately affected by liberalization. Social safety nets are dismantled, and economic shocks occur with increasing frequency as restrictions on capital flows are lifted. "Free trade" and the institutional reforms now recognized as its necessary corollaries require significant trade-offs that siphon scarce resources from programs that benefit the poor more directly. 10 Countries that have pursued liberalization seem to suffer more severe and frequent economic crises, which can lead in turn to increased economic inequality among countries. 11 Inequality within countries also has risen. "The connection between rapid trade liberalization and inequality appears to be universal, indicating downward wage pressures and rising inequality following trade liberalization in industrializing and industrialized economies. A report by UNCTAD (1997) found that trade liberalization in Latin America led to widening wage gaps, falling real wages for unskilled workers (often more than 90% of the labor force in developing countries), and rising inequality." 12 8 As Rodrick says, moreover, the most successful of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) did not follow neo-liberal orthodoxy to achieve economic growth. Neither did the developed world. Free-trade policies only formed after significant development, and they remain only partially implemented. With boards dominated by experts from northern and western countries, the IMF and the World Bank are about to undertake greater policy coordination with the WTO. Yet "the industrial countries, by violating the principles of free trade, are costing the developing countries an estimated $60 billion a year -nearly equal to the total flow of foreign assistance. 27 It fits together some bits and pieces while omitting others. In addition to historical facts and mathematical formulas, the report offers a narrative of neo-liberal globalization to shape our understandings of past and future. Evaluating it as a narrative, we can understand it as constructed, rather than natural, to identify its presuppositions and implications for our lives.
16 Accordingly the analysis differs somewhat from traditional rhetoric. The classical study of rhetoric interprets meaning and a speaker's effectiveness at communicating that message. It treats a message in terms of its logos (argument), ethos (the speaker's authority and tone), and pathos (the emotional pull on the audience exerted by the argument). This goes beyond the sense of rhetoric in ordinary language, where it refers mainly to verbal ornaments added to persuade an audience aside from the substance of any argument. But while the speaker's "true" intention is a central concern, the classical version of rhetoric is not particularly concerned with relations of power structures to language.
17 By the late 1960s, however, the field of rhetoric takes an "ideological turn." Influenced by social movements, technological developments, and postmodern or poststructural thought, rhetoricians begin to examine ties between rhetoric and social theory. A number of scholars insist that all communication connects to larger issues of politics and society. 28 Thus Raymie McKerrow calls for a "critical rhetoric" that serves a "demystifying function by demonstrating the silent and often non-deliberate ways in which rhetoric conceals as much as it reveals through its relationship with power/knowledge." 29 Following Michel Foucault, rhetoricians are analyzing the discursive field, to stress interrelationships among language, power, and social practices.
18 Discourse is "a language or system of representation that has developed socially in order to make and circulate a coherent set of meanings about an important topic area. These meanings serve the interests of that section of society within which the discourse originates and which works ideologically to naturalize those meanings into common sense. 
The Realist Style
21 As a whole, Globalization, Growth and Poverty projects an ethos -a "realist" tone -that claims sole legitimacy in the discussion. 31 This prepares the way for other tropes that reinforce the realist style of the report. It engages in a meta-discursive discussion that self-authorizes the text. Thus the report itself provides a description of the only acceptable grounds for discussion that limits potential criticism while shoring up it own position. The report also provides a peculiar picture of the social world. It reduces all politics to an economic calculus in which rational actors vie for power. In this setting, the World Bank can say it seeks power, not for its own benefit, but as an institution that can use the natural laws of self-interest to protect people living in poverty. The World Bank is not Machiavelli's prince , but it can play by his rules to help the poor. This twist can help to mask the economizing as benign; but the report still reduces politics to a single, often anti-political mode of behavior.
22 Globalization, Growth and Poverty uses this rhetoric to establish its central argument. The master trope of this "realist style" is metonymy. The description of realist rhetoric provided by Robert Hariman in studying The Prince is instructive: "This style begins by marking all other discourses with the sign of the text: It devalues other political actors because they are too discursive, too caught up in their textual designs to engage in rational calculation." 32 It aligns itself with the "real, natural" world by claiming objectivity and transparency. James Arnt Aune argues that it is "the default rhetoric for defenders of the free market. The realist economic style works by radically separating power and textuality, constructing the political realm as a state of nature, and by depicting its opponents as prisoners of verbal illusions." 33 A realist text purports merely to describe reality and therefore to avoid bias. These claims hide its strategic selection of evidence to get the particular representations that serve its interests. Because the report is objective, it is realistic, leaving no reason to distrust its prescriptions.
24 Taking on its own personality and destiny, "globalization" becomes the protagonist in the text. "Globalization" begins as a descriptive term; yet the report, with its continual placement of the noun as the subject in sentences, makes it a central actor in our political life. It is "globalization" that leads to reductions in poverty -not the politicians, bureaucrats or NGOs who make decisions regarding budgets, taxation, social spending, and trade. As it becomes a character, globalization appears less responsive to our desires and plans; it appears to have a path independent of choices by other people.
25 The report's language casts critics as obstructionists. "Integration -or 'globalization'-has generated anxieties about rising inequality, shifting power, and cultural uniformity. This report assesses its impact and examines these anxieties. Global integration is already a powerful force for poverty reduction, but it could be even more effective. Some, but not all, of the anxieties are well-founded" (p. 1). Criticisms are "anxieties," and far from all are reasonable. There is "a widespread anxiety is that growing integration is leading to heightened inequalities within countries," but "usually this is not the case" (p. 5). In fact, "between countries, globalization is now mostly reducing inequality" (p. 1). Yes, "globalization does involve shifts in power, but these do not always favor the already powerful" (p. 2). The critics are wrong; they lack the real, incontestable facts available to the Bank.
26 Worse, critics have narrow horizons and supposedly lack concern for people who live in poverty:
A "development round" of trade liberalization should focus on improving market access of developing countries to rich country markets and to each other's markets. However, such a "development round" is threatened by narrow protectionist interests in the North. Protectionists are seeking to load up the trade agenda with a host of other, institutional development issues. If the rich countries insist on institutional harmonization in areas such as intellectual property rights and standards for health, labor, and the environment as a prerequisite for market access, then prospects for greater trade between North and South will be greatly diminished (p. 9).
In this passage, the Bank aligns neo-liberalism with global prosperity and critics with protectionism. Implicitly it denigrates alternatives as irresponsible and self-interested. 36 According to the report, "in part our agenda overlaps with the agenda of the streets, but it is diametrically opposed to the nationalism, protectionism and anti-industrial romanticism that is all too prominent" (p. 18). Thus the World Bank hegemonizes the moral power of advocates for economic justice, while it links critics in civil society with at least two elements (nationalism and protectionism) that many in the global-justice movement reject and a third (anti-industrial romanticism) that depicts the movement as naïve. 27 Hariman continues, "the greatest advantage for the realist comes from constraining the wide array of public discourse -keeping deliberation within a vernacular of sovereign powers, calculations of interest and the like." 37 This style delegitimates alternatives from the start. If they are not based on considerations deemed worthy by the text, they are not reasonable or otherwise respectable. Marginalization follows. In this way, the report constricts human behavior to individual economic self-interest. The related ontology dictates proper goals for social institutions: economic growth and non-interference in the free market.
28 But the realist tone here is softened by the Bank's proclaimed intent to increase global prosperity. That is the only goal deemed worthy in the text, and the only way to achieve it is through free markets that can account for how "people really are." While the alleviation of poverty is certainly a goal of many, there are numerous interests in the developing and developed worlds. This metonymy reduces people to a social unity and fails to take into account their variety of needs. If someone makes a claim for an alternative value and denies globalization's ability to address it, the claim is devalued as "romantic," "anti-industrialist," or "protectionist." It is a personal flaw, not a legitimate political concern.
29 The private market is characterized as an arena of unrivalled efficiency and opportunity, while non-economic social organization is always suspect. The suggestion is that economic self-interest can lead to a virtuous, poverty-free society but that other values will disappoint. For example, the report acknowledges that strong institutions are crucial in a free-market 30 Another manifestation of the realist claim to objectivity and the reduction of the social world to economics is the characterization of neo-liberal globalization as unavoidable. This rhetoric denies the social construction of both the theoretical concept and material reality. It presents this particular manifestation of power as the unfolding of natural laws. 38 Neo-liberal globalization is part of the "grand narrative" of world history that is to structure the reader's understanding of past and present. 39 "Corporate financiers, as well as spokesmen for national government . . . use the language of capital mobility to obscure the notion that other choices have been possible." 40 In this spirit, the report claims that "a century ago globalization seemed as inevitable as it does today" (p. 4). It discusses ways that globalization previously receded and might be rolled back in the future, but these are always unnatural and "vain," leading to war, destruction, and poverty (p. 27). 32 Yet realist rhetoric can be characterized by an inability to fully account for itself. 42 In its denigration of politics and communication, it ends up unable to explain the full range of human behavior, as promised. It has acute trouble facing its own frustrations. When its predictions do not materialize but its critics do, the rhetoric reaches erratically beyond its core categories. As "free-market" reforms lead to economic crises in the developing world, for example, advocates begin to stress the need for effective "institutions" of other kinds. These add to requirements for development and increase costs of compliance, but they do not modify neo-liberal theories or imply that neo-liberal reforms might be to blame for problems (p. 10). 43 Like a "pathology of rationalchoice," neo-liberal rhetoric claims an exemption to charges of failure on the grounds that previously unforeseen (but logical) components of the formula were insufficiently addressed in practice. But if "non-accountable non-governmental organizations" cannot be trusted to pursue agendas other than their own, how can the World Bank expect the non-interference it claims to need (p. 124)?
33 The ruling logic of neo-liberal globalization requires a purity in practice that its own principles imply it could not have. According to neo-liberals, free markets do not fail in the developing world; they do not get tried there. IFI policies run into trouble, say neoliberals, because of continued rent-seeking on the part of developing societies. Somehow these societies do not include the markets or the IFIs. Nor on the other side do their insufficient services, deficiencies in democratic sovereignty, or neo-colonial relations with the developed world surface as intrinsic impediments. Politics are inefficient and corrupt; economics are efficient and virtuous. If only the neo-liberal economic model were fully implemented, it would lead to the most prosperous, equitable, and environmentally sustainable society possible. Sadly, politics are allowed to intrude. This crucial step in neo-liberal apologies has no place in neo-liberal theories.
Branding "Globalization" 34 Enabled by its realist tone, Globalization, Growth and Poverty argues for beneficial consequences of globalization. In doing so, IFI discourse attempts to brand its prescriptions as the one way to fulfill its mandate to alleviate poverty worldwide. The branding occurs as advocates of neo-liberal globalization link their project to a variety of social goods. Laclau and Mouffe call these "chains of equivalence," to indicate how discourses work through connecting objects and ideas to modify their meanings for audiences. 44 Some links are positive, tying items together; other links are negative, shedding previous associations. The report ties globalization positively to "free markets" but negatively to "deforestation" and "sub-Saharan Africa," working to divorce globalization from those objects.
35 Globalization, Growth and Poverty repeats some chains or clusters to gain consent for globalization. The fundamental link is between globalization and poverty reduction. According to the foreword, "the focus of our research is the impact of economic integration on developing countries and especially on the poor people living in these countries" (p. ix). The report seeks credibility for the World Bank as an advocate for poor. Indeed it implies that the Bank has no predetermined concern except for the welfare of those who live in poverty.
36 The very title of the report, "Globalization, Growth and Poverty," connects these three elements: globalization leads to growth, which alleviates poverty. The opening paragraph affirms this: "global integration is already a powerful force for poverty reduction" (p. 1). The penultimate sentence restates it: "Many poor people are benefiting from globalization" (p. 159). These links are so insistent in the report that they eclipse its acknowledgment of disputes about them. "Globalization" and "openness" are "pro-poor," producing "poverty reduction," "growth," "rising productivity," "opportunity," [economic] "convergence," "weakened monopolies," and a "raise in per capita income." Globalization virtually comes to mean poverty reduction, so that critics who resist economic integration are pursuing policies that necessarily will harm the poor. 38 The report also sheds any responsibility of globalization for "marginalized countries," including many in Africa and the former Soviet Union. It treats them as foils for the successful integrators. Awkward countries (including sub-Saharan Africa) and histories (like colonialism) get distanced rhetorically from globalization. They have been marginalized, the report explains, because of adverse geography and climate as well as poor (internal) policies and infrastructure (p. 7). The report mentions capital flight from Africa but sees it as an exodus of domestic wealth in search of security and profit rather than a response to capital volatility induced by global trade (p. 41). The report ignores the legacies of colonization, failed privatization, loan conditionality, and debt crises. The marginal countries appear to have failed in a historical vacuum, without any ties to international dynamics. The text does include a critical discussion of trade barriers in the OECD countries; but it focuses on the current scene and neglects any consideration of potentially valid reasons for maintaining certain tariffs, subsidies, or quotas. The notion that Africa is poor because it cannot join the global market since it has a bad climate is poor social science, it masks the entire colonial experience, and it leaves any blame to corrupt domestic politicians or bad luck. (The Bank is there to help.) De-linking poverty from Africa's history of colonization, then Western neglect and domination, the rhetoric crafts a sense of the situation amenable to the World Bank's project of globalization. 39 The presentation of economic data in Globalization, Growth and Poverty links neo-liberal globalization to "Science." Contributing to the realist tone of the report, the data imply an authority that cannot be questioned. The principal author describes the report, with its abundant tables and statistics, as a "detailed and accurate statement." 45 The report includes 55 graphs, tables, and maps in 159 pages. This profusion of data suggests that the report is a collection of facts speaking for themselves --and all saying the Poroi, 3, 1, June, 2004 same thing: globalization is good. Yet the data come from statistical analysis that varies with the specification of models, which varies across hosts of debatable assumptions. This is why, as McCloskey says, economics must work through "trust, conversation, persuasion." 46 Instead the report offers its data as expert, neutral verdicts. The report is reality speaking. McCloskey cautions that "The suppression of the 'I' in scientific writing is more significant than one might think . . . the scientist says: It is not I the scientist who make these assertions but reality itself. . . . Scientists pretend that Nature speaks directly, thereby effacing the evidence that they the scientists are responsible for the assertions. . . . The scientist avoids being questioned for his reliability by disappearing into a third-person narrative of what really happened." 47 40 The report could have emphasized factors that it instead largely ignores, such as civil-society input. Its exclusive attention to econometric analysis shapes not only the conclusions but even the conceptions of questions and possible answers. This "methodism" can lead to a neglect of contextual factors and "foster a technicism, instrumentalism, and impatience that obscure political complexities." 48 Of course, the quality of empirical evidence depends on the quality of data-gathering, which can be notoriously difficult in the developing world. In some cases, the difficulty appears to be intentionally concealed. One telephone survey cited by the report asked 20,000 people in 20 countries whether they thought "globalization would materially benefit their families," and it found that people answered in the affirmative by a 2-to-1 margin (p. 15). The original draft notes that the poor were more or less excluded, because they often lack telephones, but the published report omits this niggling detail. 41 The report pays little attention to studies by economists who contest the power of open trade to improve the lives of the poor. "The doubts that one can retain about each individual study," it says, "threaten to block our view of the overall forest of evidence" (p. 5). In a sidebar, the report acknowledges the Rodriguez and Rodrick criticism of measures used to gauge trade openness, then it turns back to evidence for links between open trade and growth as though the criticism had never arisen (p. 37). The report presents the community of trained economists as relatively united; it barely notes the increasingly loud debate. The report simply claims that the "preponderance" of expert-derived evidence supports globalization (p. 5), and it minimizes the fact that several prominent economists reach different conclusions. 46 Richard Falk calls these "world order priorities" and claims that they "relate, first and foremost, to protecting the planet and its inhabitants from the ongoing gathering of destructive tendencies that currently threaten human well-being and the viability of the global commons. . . .
[They] also extend to affirming an ethos of human solidarity." 59 As these counter-norms exert pressure, the rhetoric of IFIs shifts. We can see this in the report's attempt to disperse tensions from these critiques by appropriating their values within the Bank's own discourse. 60 47 Rhetorical chains in Globalization, Growth and Poverty treat globalization as the route to economic growth solutions for many social problems. Four of the report's sections cite critics to identify a range of social problems. The report's strategy is to show how globalization alleviates them or does no further damage. Its hegemonizing rhetoric is clearly exhibited in these sections: "Social protection in globalizing economies," "Globalization and power," "Globalization and culture," and "Globalization and the environment." The report includes the values espoused by critics in the list of worthy goals that the World Bank hopes to achieve through globalization. The concessions are partial at most. Thus the Bank does not advocate a more cautious approach to free trade in order to protect against "Americanization," but claims that only globalization can lead to cultural diversity. In these acts of ironic appropriation, the discourse attempts to broaden the base of consent to its policies. It recomposes meanings to absorb criticism and renew support, but it does not acceptance other voices as equal contributors to a broader development project. It re-asserts the Bank's unified authority, and it rejects any role for deliberation or democratic decision-making. Implicitly it denies that the report is partisan and suggests that the critics are self-interested. Coupled with the realist tone of the report, the rhetoric offers at best a fatherly pat on the head. 48 The report specifically seeks to quell criticism as a threat to the consensus that the Bank imputes to its mission. The environmental movement has provided a strong challenge to freetrade advocates, and the report devotes several pages to green concerns. Global Trade Watch argues for greater environmental protection and connects degradation with an unregulated economic sphere. The report claims that the World Bank shares green goals and that globalization is the way to a cleaner planet. It cites a study that links globalization to improved air quality in industrial centers (p. 16); and its section on "Globalization and Environment" takes what at first appears to be a very sober look at environmental degradation throughout the world, addressing "beggar-thyself" environmental standards (p. 130). Yet the report finds that evidence does not support the fear of a "race to the bottom." It says that industries servicing domestic demands produce the most pollution, it argues that Western subsidiaries do not appear to pollute more than indigenous industries, and it says that they tend to adopt "near-uniform" standards throughout their corporate structures (p. 132).
49 But the claims that Chevron pollutes no more in Nigeria than in Mississippi and pollutes less than would a domestic firm are cold comfort to environmentalists. The report concedes that "many countries are simply not implementing pollution abatement measures that are readily available, cheap, and effective" (p. 134). Again, though, the report frames the issues as if these countries exist in a vacuum, with pollution the fault of domestic rather than international actors. The report lists local popular movements, effective domestic regulation, and international collective action (but only with regard to global warming, put into a different section than the more general "pollution") as the keys to environmental protection. It says that globalization facilitates these through spreading "innovative idea[s]" (p. 143). It portrays as a "protectionist" ploy the notion that "institutional harmonization in areas such as . . . the environment" might become "a prerequisite for market access" (p. 9). The report embraces open markets as the only path to social goods, while it derides stricter regulations for environmental or other reasons.
50 Critics also complain about the lack of participation in the policy formation for open trade. The report calls for increased participation of developing countries in trade negotiations, but it ignores democratizing trade institutions to focus on encouraging developing countries to improve their own cooperation and knowledge bases (pp. 63-64). Considering the moral traction of the global-justice movement, the appropriation is logical. The report's advocacy of globalization must compete with counterpublics, but it can only do so by acknowledging their validity then shifting blame so that actual bets get placed on open markets. The report repeatedly invokes the importance of participation, but it insistently paints civil societies as a rent-seeking and untrustworthy partners for trade. At first, the report lauds "globalization from below" as a way to limit the unrestrained power of capital. It even cites civil-society pressure on De Beers in response to its diamond buying practices in Africa (p. 124). In the same paragraph, though, the report maintains that civil involvement "is not an unmitigated good. Non-accountable nongovernmental organizations . . . can sometimes exploit [popular] ignorance to pursue their own agendas at the expense of poor people" (p. 124).
51 The reports coöpts criticisms also by linking globalization to stable levels of inequality. Unregulated economic expansion actually aggravates socioeconomic stratification. 61 When the report acknowledges increasing inequalities within OECD economies, it finds causes other than free trade: "A part of this may be due to immigration. However, it may also have been due to policy changes on taxation and social spending unconnected to globalization. . . . globalization has probably been equalizing" (p. 48 ). Yet changes in tax structures connect with globalization. Countries engage in tax competition to attract business and capital, and they locate more jobs in the informal or lower-wage service sectors when they let corporations "use extra 'flexibility' in labor laws . . . to shed and downsize." 62 52 The report denies that inequality has increased in low-income countries, save for China (p. 48), but this is a dubious claim. 63 The reports notes contrary evidence only once: "They find no relationship between changes in openness and changes in inequality. . . . Ravallion qualifies this result. He finds that although on average openness does not affect inequality, in low-income countries it is associated with greater inequality. Regardless of its net effect, there are winners and losers from trade policies. . . . The combination of rapid growth with no systematic change in inequality has dramatically reduced absolute poverty in the new globalizers" (pp. [48] [49] . A page later, the last paragraph concludes that "globalization clearly can be a force for poverty reduction." So the report asserts that globalization means lowincome countries have greater inequality yet greater equality. It buries the complexity of the situation in contradictory claims and unexplained data. Its rhetoric offers claims "regardless of net effect," when its conclusions base themselves on net effects. Overall it elides the unhappy effects of increased stratification on those least equipped to bear it.
53 Globalization, Growth and Poverty encourages countries to develop various programs of social protection. These are to target both formal-and informal-sector employees as integration brings about (merely) short-term dislocations (p. 87). Yet the report also says that a large public-employment sector would limit the benefits of globalization and that the imposition of a standard set of labor regulations across the globe is of doubtful benefit. Meanwhile the report promotes greater liberalization of trade through privatizing services and providing competition in primary utilities such as power and water delivery. It gives developing countries the option of financing short-term unemployment insurance schemes, with the hope that the economy will recover from crisis before its funds run out. Considering that standards would vary from one country to the next, that tax structures would vary, and there would be a greater emphasis on privatization and a "sound investment climate," it is hard to see how a "race to the bottom" would not occur. The report accepts social protection as a necessity, given the (short-term) volatility from liberalizing trade, but its neo-liberal provisions leave acceptable measures for social protection hard to imagine.
54 Critics worry about the "Americanization" of world culture as U.S. brand names become consumables of choice around the world. The report replies that economic integration increases "diversity."
McDonald's has brought "hamburgers to Britain, co-existing with fish and chips" (p. 15). Ikea has entered Russian markets but "has not driven out Russian style" (p. 129). To show that Wal-Mart has not driven out of business every other general store in North Carolina is not to make it a harbinger of cosmopolitanism or a model for labor policy. The report seems to equate "diversity" with the spread of large corporations throughout the world. Here is a rhetoric of homogenous diversity. 
Technocracy and the Public
57 Many affected by neo-liberal globalization have it imposed on them. Still it is striking that resistance has been largely silent or sporadic. Advocates of globalization have been able to find many supporters in the developing world as well as the developed world. 64 If globalization were just economic policy, this might not be surprising, but it also generates a particular political subjectivity. Although it remains popular to talk about "democracy" as politics worth struggling and even dying for, there is a little mainstream discussion of how this form of global economy might pre-empt people's democratic ability to determine what policies their country will follow. As a discourse, globalization normalizes non-democratic politics by assuming that (1) economics is a natural science, (2) public needs can be addressed best by markets, so (3) publics should step aside to let economies and economists function naturally to determine social conditions.
58 The World Bank is a large organization with varied interests and multiple legacies. Its report on Globalization, Growth and Poverty often acknowledges the need for local input and the existence of many paths toward development. Yet many of the report's passages and the Bank's policies, like those of corollary institutions such as the IMF and the WTO, endorse only the route of neo-liberal reform. It becomes the objective output of scientific analysis, the one way to rid developing countries of "special interests," and the best way to achieve such desirable results as less inequality, environmental protection, and global diversity. Giving short shrift to dissenters, neo-liberal discourse presents itself as the consensus of mainstream economists, the only experts on development. Turning politics into economics, neo-liberalism makes the policy landscape increasingly "technocratic."
59 "Politics," as Frank Fischer writes, are "increasingly reduced to the technically oriented task of 'keeping the machine running.' Economic and political guidance becomes more a problem of planning and management than an issue for public deliberations, and, as such, is seen as a job for which only the experts are uniquely equipped." 65 Make no mistake: these anti-politics are highly political. They require publics that consent to their formation as audiences or clients rather than participants. Neoliberal discourse secures the consent tacitly through its rhetorical construction of the social world. It presupposes necessity (as opposed to contingency) and self-regulating orders (rather than collective problems). 66 In the neo-liberal world, the best path to success is public disengagement. Once that occurs, necessity and the natural laws of the market can function under the oversight of academically trained economists rather than rent-seeking publics.
60 Unfortunately this economic technocracy is not radically out-ofstep with some current "democratic theory." The definition of democracy most prevalent in political science, national governments, and institutions like Freedom House continues to be Joseph Schumpeter's: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people's vote." 67 Democracy becomes a mere method, implying a view of citizen as consumers and of politicians as the centers of power. Supposedly this prefers no particular outcomes or inclusions. Once the people choose elites, participation ends until the next election. This eliminates the "danger" that public participation might affect policies. Social scientists often treat this as the most accurate way to define "democracy," and "the contemporary theory of democracy does not merely describe the operation of certain political systems, but implies that this is the kind of system that we should value." 68 Purported description becomes prescription, and publics grow accustomed to low levels of participation within elite-led systems. Technocracy requires elites, not masses. Within a globalized system, this conception of democracy threatens to obscure the transfer of power to IFIs, and it promises to normalize public deference to their decisions. 65 These tropes pose significant challenges to critics of neo-liberal globalization. Yet there remain openings for counter-hegemonic projects. The strength of the dominant discourse lies in its ability to regulate debate: absorbing criticisms or dismissing them as irrational. But the fact that neo-liberal discourse must make the effort to hegemonize and encompass counter-norms is heartening. Some see this characteristic as one of the most frustrating qualities of the discourse, and I agree. Let us not, however, miss the counter-power apparent in this situation.
Possibilities for a Counter-Hegemonic Project
66 Neo-liberal discourse focuses on the realm of consent. It maintains authority for the project of globalization by hegemonizing commonsense counter-norms of equality promotion, environmental protection, and poverty reduction. The power of those counter-norms to secure consent surfaces when critics start to reframe debate. We can have politics only when we have some shared understandings and values that enable us to make sense to one another. This is keeping alternative values alive on both sides of the debate, even though their meanings become highly contested.
67 Critics can take advantage of the play in meanings to keep neoliberal discourse from eliminating counter-indications and criticisms. The task can be arduous, especially in publics dominated by neo-liberal institutions. Yet movements against globalization suggest that some room remains for contesting such neo-liberal assertions as market mechanisms provide best for environmental protection. Publication of counter-evidence is starting to seem fairly effective. The report's impressive efforts to hegemonize counter-claims testifies to this, and that kind of articulation opens neo-liberal discourse to further dispute.
68 Moral traction for democracy means significant possibilities for critique. There are no promises for success. Contradictions in a discourse or a practice need not find some progressive resolution.
To expose fissures within neo-liberal globalization nonetheless can become a step toward undermining its power. To distinguish participatory from liberal democracy can help. Where neo-liberal globalization seems less than effective, objective, necessary, or coherent, doubts can arise. In turn, these can weaken the consent that neo-liberal globalization wants to win from ordinary people as well as elites. Rhetoricians who help to denaturalize globalization can contribute significantly to the ensuing politics. The report does not describe the intended audience, but the report figured prominently in the "Publications" section of the World Bank's Web site. This warrants the assumption that the report addresses anyone in the general public with an interest in the World Bank. (The same goes for the Bank's annual World Development Report.) The Web site has links for "NGOs and Civil Society," "Researchers," "Students," "Journalists," "Bond Investors," and "Parliamentarians," indicating some groups that the people at the World Bank believe to be looking for information on their projects.
3 September 11, 2001 and the resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have caused re-evaluations and shifts in focus on both sides. Nonetheless the debate has continued. For example, one reason the peace movement was able to mobilize so quickly was because the "anti-globalization" movement was already in place and gearing up to protest a World Bank meeting in Washington, DC on September 29.
4
Whether this embrace attempts co-optation I cannot say. The focus here is on effects of the text rather than intentions of the authors.
5
The Bretton Woods Project, "More WTO -World Bank -IMF Cooperation on Trade," November 2, 2001, argued that these two variables have an inverted U-shaped relationship, with the highest inegalitarianism arising at the middle levels of development: "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American Economic Review, 45 
